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I. Introduction
Medicare politics has been remarkably turbulent in recent years. The
current debate over Medicare prescription drug coverage is only the latest
episode in a decade-long political drama. In 1995, the Republican
congressional leadership, led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich,
proposed sweeping changes in the program. A rancorous debate with President
Bill Clinton and congressional Democrats ensued. It was, in fact, the most
high-profile, acrimonious, and sustained debate over Medicare since the fight
that preceded the program's enactment in 1965. Still, Republican
congressional majorities passed their Medicare reform bill in 1995, only to have
* Associate Professor of Social Medicine, University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill.
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President Clinton veto the bill. After all of the political tumult and calls for
program restructuring, Medicare reform deadlocked.
Only two years later, the direction of Medicare politics reversed: with
scant public attention or political theater, Congress and the Clinton
administration agreed to a major overhaul of Medicare as part of the 1997
Balanced Budget Act (BBA). Many policymakers and analysts viewed passage
of the BBA as a milestone in Medicare politics. Managed care was ascendant
in the private sector, as growing numbers of Americans enrolled (or were
enrolled by their employers) in Health Maintenance Organizations, Preferred
Provider Organizations, and a host of new plans that promised to control health
spending. Medicare, whose basic structure had remained largely intact since its
adoption in 1965, appeared to a growing number of observers to be out of step
and badly in need of modernization. The BBA, they believed, would at long
last usher in a historic transformation of Medicare by introducing competition,
choice, and market dynamics into the program.
Yet by 2003, the expected transformation still had not materialized.
Indeed, many effects of the 1997 Medicare reforms were exactly the opposite of
what observers had anticipated: managed care plans abandoned Medicare or
raised premiums while cutting covered benefits; beneficiary enrollment in
Medicare HMOs stalled; and the expected diverse menu of private insurance
options for Medicare beneficiaries never developed.' The reality of Medicare
reform thus bore little resemblance to the rhetoric of market transformation.
Judged against some of its central aims, today Medicare+Choice appears to
have been a classic case of public policy failure.
After a decade of largely failed reform efforts, then, the future of Medicare
is unclear. Medicare's exposure to the political spotlight, however, is hardly a
thing of the past. In recent years, the political momentum to add outpatient
prescription drug coverage to Medicare has intensified and finally culminated
in adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare in December 2003. President
Bush declared in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union address that "health
care reform must begin with Medicare."2 The benefit links an ambitious and
politically divisive vision of program reform seeking to expand the role of
1. See Marsha Gold, Can Managed Care and Competition Control Medicare Costs?,
HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-176-88 (Apr. 2,2003) (reporting declining enrollment, fewer
available plans, and reduced benefits available in Medicare+Choice programs during last few
years, but noting that enrollment remains higher than before Balanced Budget Act of 1997), at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives.php (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/.
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private insurers in Medicare.3 Under the original Bush plan, Medicare
beneficiaries receive broader coverage for prescription drugs only by
joining a private managed care plan; Medicare enrollees not enrolling in
"enhanced Medicare" but remaining in traditional Medicare would have
received a more limited prescription drug benefit.4
The Bush administration's failure to recommend a significant
Medicare drug benefit for all beneficiaries and its decision to load the
dice against traditional Medicare immediately drew criticism from
Democrats5 and some Republicans. 6 Representative Billy Tauzin (R-La.)
quipped that "you couldn't move my mother out of Medicare with a
bulldozer."7  The administration produced only a framework for
legislation, leaving the crucial details to Congress.8 In June of 2003,
though, there was an unexpected breakthrough in the Senate, leading to
enactment of a Medicare drug bill with bipartisan support; the House of
Representatives followed by passing their own bill. Yet euphoria over
the prospect of finally adding drug coverage to Medicare faded as the
vast differences between the House and Senate bills became clear in
conference committee. In particular, the House bill would have
transformed Medicare from a defined benefit to a defined contribution
system and forced the traditional Medicare program to compete with
private insurers on the basis of price, while the Senate bill envisioned
only incremental changes to Medicare's existing structure. The
differences in the House and Senate bills tapped into a broader debate on
Medicare reform and the role of markets and government in health care,
making their resolution difficult. It is clear, however, that given the
impending retirement of the baby boom generation and the program's
3. See Mike Allen, Bush to Seek New Medicare Drug Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,2003,
at Al (noting that under President Bush's new Medicare plan, patients who sign up with private
insurers would receive "much more extensive benefits").
4. See Press Release, White House, Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare
Fact Sheet (Mar. 4, 2003) (comparing percentage discount on prescription drugs that remains in
traditional Medicare to President Bush's plan for comprehensive coverage under privatized
"Enhanced Medicare" plan), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/
20030304-1 .html.
5. See Allen, supra note 3 (reporting vocal opposition from several key Democrats).
6. See Amy Goldstein, On Medicare, Bush Left Details to Congress, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2003, at A4 ("Reaction [to President Bush's Medicare proposal] from key Republicans has
been relatively tepid .... ").
7. Allen, supra note 3.
8. See Goldstein, supra note 6 (describing Bush administration's decision to provide a
guideline for Medicare reform, while allowing Congress "ample room" to design its own plan).
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growing claim on the federal budget, the issue of Medicare reform will
remain at the center of American politics and health policy throughout
the next two decades.
This Article places recent developments in Medicare politics in
context by offering a political history of Medicare reform. Are the
politics of Medicare heading in a fundamentally new direction or simply
repeating past patterns? What explains the decade of apparent failure in
Medicare reform and what model of reform will likely emerge? What
political forces will determine the future course of Medicare policy? This
Article aims to describe the central themes of Medicare's political
history, with a focus on the last decade of program policy, in order to
address those questions and illuminate the significance of contemporary
debates over Medicare reform.
I argue that one can understand Medicare's political development
from 1966 to 1994 as predominantly one of consensus. 9 That is, during
this period a de facto consensus over program philosophy, structure, and
operations represented the defining element in Medicare politics, which
was often both bipartisan and quiescent. The tumult in Medicare since
1995 signals the unraveling of that consensus and the emergence-or
more precisely, the re-emergence-of a competing vision for organizing
the program.' 0 At its core, this vision seeks to transform Medicare from a
health insurance program into a health insurance market."
Consequently, the debate over federal health insurance for the aged that
ended with Medicare's enactment in 1965 has, I contend, been
reopened. 2
Part II of this Article describes the origins of Medicare and the
character of the consensus that governed program politics for three
decades. Next, Part III explains why that consensus unraveled in the
context of a changing political environment and health care system. Part
IV examines the 1997 Medicare reforms and their aftermath. Finally,
Part V describes the debate over prescription drug coverage and the
implications for the present and future politics of Medicare. In Part VI,
this Article concludes that the long debate over Medicare politics has
come full circle back to its origins in the 1960s.
9. JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 5 (2003).
10. See id. at 179 (noting movement to transform Medicare into "competitive market, a
managed competition system that embraced managed care").
11. Id.
12. See id. at 6 (describing shift in Medicare politics from consensus to controversy).
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II. Medicare's Origins and the Politics of Consensus, 1966-1994
The early history of Medicare was anything but consensual. Social
Security administrators, frustrated by the failure of the Truman administration's
national health insurance legislation, proposed federal hospital insurance for the
aged in 1952 as a more incremental and politically feasible option. They
believed that sympathy for the elderly, as well as appeals to the popularity of
Social Security and a restricted benefit package that omitted coverage for
physician services, would enable Medicare legislation to successfully navigate
the gauntlet of opposition. 3 This opposition coalesced around the influence of
the American Medical Association (AMA), the power of the conservative
coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats (which constituted a working
majority in Congress), and the Cold War stigma of "socialized medicine" that
had stopped the Truman NHI plan.'
4
Despite strategic concessions, however, Medicare reproduced the same
political cleavages and controversies that had marked earlier disputes over
national health insurance. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Medicare was a
polarizing issue in American politics. On one side, liberals, unions, and union-
sponsored elderly advocacy groups mobilized for passage of the program; in
opposition stood organized medicine, business, and conservatives. 5 The AMA
was unimpressed with the narrowed benefits. The group warned that sixty days
of hospital insurance for the elderly still amounted to socialized medicine and
threatened an unacceptable slippery slope toward national health insurance. As
a consequence, from 1958 to 1964 a high-profile, ideological, and highly
partisan political contest existed over Medicare legislation. The liberal
landslide in the 1964 elections finally settled that contest, leading to Medicare's
enactment the following year with a much broader scope and a more generous
benefit package than even program advocates had thought possible. (The
legislation also established Medicaid and provided elderly beneficiaries with
coverage, under Medicare Part B, for physician services and hospitalization).
16
13. See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 10-11 (2d ed. 2000)
(explaining that Truman's Social Security advisors shifted their focus toward providing
government health insurance for aged Americans, rather than general population, because of
such program's political feasibility).
14. See id. at 17-21 (describing how Republicans and Southern Democrats characterized
Medicare as "entering wedge of the Socialized State," and discussing American Medical
Association's role in furthering that perception).
15. See id. (discussing alignment of various interest groups in years prior to Medicare's
enactment).
16. See id. at 45-47 (describing Democrats' substantial victory in 1964 election, which
led to easy passage of strengthened Medicare bill).
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Yet, the controversial origins of Medicare receded once the program began
operation. Medicare became a cherished institution in American political life,
broadly popular with the public as one of the few acknowledged successes of
the welfare state.' 7 The popularity of Medicare was due in large part to the
substantial number of American families it helped, and it continues to have a
broad impact. For instance, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
projected that in 2003, Medicare would provide health insurance to thirty-five
million elderly and six million disabled persons.18
The reach of Medicare, however, extends far beyond elderly and disabled
beneficiaries. The program also spares children and grandchildren the burdens
of paying for much of their parents' or grandparents' medical care. Moreover,
unlike other government programs serving only the poor, such as the now-
defunct Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicare's
constituency has retained a middle-class identity because all retirees are eligible
for the program regardless of their income.
As noted above, the controversy surrounding Medicare's enactment
disappeared once the program began operation. Political opponents who
otherwise disliked the program learned, at least, to accommodate its political
popularity. Members of Congress, as well as presidential administrations, vied
to be seen as friends of the program. More crucially, they wanted to avoid
being seen as a threat to Medicare, lest they pay a heavy price at election time.
The policy world similarly accommodated Medicare's popularity. Most health
care analysts focused on incremental proposals to make Medicare's existing
structure more efficient and equitable, rather than on creating a new program
structure.19 The status quo appeared so powerful that one analyst questioned
17. See FAY LOMAX COOK ET AL., SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE: VIEWS OF
CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC 62 (1992) (reporting that, in random nationwide 1986 survey, 67.6%
of respondents believed that government should increase Medicare benefits; this result was 10%
higher than poll results for any other social welfare program).
18. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLEES SELECTED YEARS, in
2002 DATA COMPENDIUM, http://www.cms.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/2002/ (Sept.
2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See KAREN DAVIS & DIANE ROWLAND, MEDICARE POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE 72 (1986) ("Major steps need to be taken to improve, rather than
dismantle, programs that have brought many gains and achieved notable successes."); MARILYN
MOON, MEDICARE: NOW AND IN THE FUTURE 219-37 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing various potential
improvements to existing Medicare system, such as containing provider costs, expanding
managed care options, revising cost sharing, and increasing direct costs for beneficiaries). See
generally RENEWING THE PROMISE: MEDICARE AND ITS REFORM (David Blumenthal et al. eds.,
1988); Thomas Rice & Jill Bernstein, Volume Performance Standards: Can They Control
Growth in Medicare Services?, 68 MILBANK Q. 295 (1990) (discussing volume performance
standards, an incremental modification to Medicare payment protocol intended to control costs).
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whether his own proposal for Medicare restructuring through vouchers
amounted to "the impossible dream."2°
Medicare's popularity meant that the essence of the program adopted in
1965-its philosophy, structure, and goals-became institutionalized. The
programmatic boundaries of Medicare marked a political boundary that
opponents rarely dared to cross. A de facto, implicit consensus consequently
developed around Medicare. The consensus was, at root, liberal because in
several crucial respects Medicare was a liberal program. Medicare's architects,
who previously worked for the Social Security Administration, were committed
advocates of social insurance and government activism to redress social
problems.2 The programmatic structure of Medicare reflected their liberal
vision; it was government health insurance, a public program that the federal
government organized and operated on the social insurance model.
In the contemporary parlance of health policy, Medicare is a single-payor
health insurance program. Medicare's embrace of single-payor insurance has
been a well-kept secret in a nation where many ironically consider single-payor
insurance to be politically infeasible and culturally taboo.22 Yet, failure to
acknowledge that Medicare represents a form of single-payor insurance does
not change the fact that the program shares the main properties of the single-
payor model: universality for its population, government-operated insurance,
and centralized cost control.
The Medicare consensus was so strong, and challenges to it so rare, that
policymakers and analysts have often forgotten that the form of health
insurance that Medicare represented in 1965-public insurance-was not the
only option available to cover the elderly. One alternative would have been for
the federal government to provide the elderly with subsidies or vouchers to
purchase private health insurance from commercial insurers. Under such a
system, the federal government would not have operated its own public
20. See Robert Bovbjerg, Vouchers for Medicare: The Impossible Dream, in LESSONS
FROM THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF MEDICARE 25, 25 (Mark Pauly et al. eds., 1988) (posing
question whether Medicare vouchers are impossible dream and suggesting that only experience
can provide answer).
21. See MARMOR, supra note 13, at 10-11 (discussing Social Security Administration's
desire to broach idea of national heath insurance by providing health insurance for aged
persons); Robert Ball, What Medicare's Architects Had In Mind, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at
62, 63-65 (same); Eiuc R. KFNGSON & EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER 45 (1993) ("Social Security officials persisted in their argument
that a social insurance approach would both protect the dignity of America's older people and
avoid burdening the general taxpayer with the cost of their health care.").
22. See Alain Enthoven, Letter to the Editor, 5 THE AM. PROSPECT 20, 20-22 (1991)
(arguing that Canadian health care system is politically unfeasible in United States).
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insurance program, but rather, it would have supervised Medicare as an actor in
the private insurance market. This was, in fact, the preferred approach of
Medicare opponents when the electoral results of 1964 made Medicare's
enactment inevitable, forcing them to formulate their own plans.23
Why, then, did Medicare emerge in 1965 as a public insurance program,
rather than a system of subsidized private insurance? Perhaps the most
important reason was that the preferences of the social insurance advocates who
designed Medicare largely determined its character.24 They assumed that
public insurance was the most appropriate, efficient, and just model of medical
care delivery.25 The glaring inability of the private insurance market at the time
to cover retirees appeared to confirm their preferences. The most compelling
argument in favor of public medical insurance for the elderly was that the
market had failed to meet their needs.
In the aftermath of the 1964 elections, the programmatic structure of
Medicare reflected the dominant political current of liberalism. The structure
of any health insurance program carries with it a corresponding set of values,
social commitments, and political dynamics. In 1965, the properties of public
health insurance matched the values and social commitments favored by the
liberal majority: universalism, government responsibility for social welfare
provision, and public accountability. At a different time, under different
ideological and electoral circumstances, Medicare could have become a very
different program.
The Medicare consensus, then, was the idea that Medicare should remain a
government-operated insurance program and that public insurance was the
proper vehicle to guarantee access to medical care for the elderly. The
consensual character of Medicare politics, however, extended beyond
acceptance of these broad principles and reached various areas of policy
development. Absent a debate over ideology or programmatic first-principles, a
striking degree of bipartisanship characterized Medicare policymaking during
the program's first three decades, bipartisanship reinforced by the divided
government that was the norm in American politics for much of this era.
Certainly during this era in Medicare politics, Democrats and Republicans
23. See EUGENE FEINGOLD, MEDICARE: POLICY AND POLITICS 140 (1966) (noting that
American Medical Association advocated "Eldercare," under which government would
supervise private market for health insurance, after 1964 Democrat landslide made clear that
Congress would pass some form of Medicare).
24. See Ball, supra note 21, at 63 (explaining preference of Medicare's architects for
public social insurance model).
25. See MARMOR, supra note 13, at 7 (discussing strong belief of Truman and his
supporters that all Americans should have access to public health insurance, regardless of their
financial means).
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disagreed on important issues. For instance, they disagreed over whom should
bear the financial burden of rising Medicare costs. Further, some conservatives
continued to oppose Medicare as social insurance.26 But partisan differences
were ultimately far less impressive than the similarities between the two parties'
positions on Medicare. Medicare's congressional enemies were few in number,
and their political impact was negligible.
The consensual, bipartisan character of Medicare politics was evident in
three major areas of program policy: benefits, financing, and regulation. With
respect to expanding benefits, the consensus was primarily negative For two
decades Medicare benefits for the elderly remained essentially the same as they
had been in the 1965 legislation. The stability in benefits occurred despite the
presumed existence of strong forces for expansion, including the reputed
political power of the elderly and the quite limited protection against medical
care costs that the original Medicare program provided. However, cost
overruns in Medicare's first years of operation produced fiscal concerns that
defused pressures to expand program benefits.27 Medicare quickly acquired a
reputation, as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee Russell Long put it in
1969, as being a "runaway program" and, consequently, fiscal constraints drove
both Democratic and Republican positions on Medicare policy.
28
While Medicare's popularity forced conservative Republicans to accept its
existence, it similarly forced liberal Democrats to accept the program's existing
benefit package, limitations and all. Democrats, after all, controlled both
houses of Congress from the program's enactment in 1964 until 1981. Yet
Democratic congressional majorities enacted no substantial expansions of
program benefits for the elderly during this period. Congress designed the
addition of ESRD and disability as conditions for Medicare eligibility in 1972
to make new populations eligible for Medicare, rather than to enhance benefits
for elderly beneficiaries.29 Nor did the Democratic Party frequently raise
Medicare benefit expansion as a first-order electoral issue between 1966 and
1994.
26. See MAx J. SKIDMORE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND ITS ENEMIES 87 (1999) (describing
Ronald Reagan's long campaign against social insurance programs such as Social Security and
Medicare).
27. See OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 47 (suggesting that Medicare benefits did not
expand during program's first two decades because of its reputation as "uncontrollable burden
on the federal government").
28. Mark Schlesinger et al., Medicare's Coverage of Health Services, in RENEWING THE
PROMISE: MEDICARE AND ITS REFORM 58, 69 (David Blumenthal et al. eds., 1988) (arguing that
conservatives intended early on to cap Medicare benefits).
29. See OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 40-43 (discussing reasons why Congress did not
expand Medicare benefits during program's first two decades).
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The politics of Medicare benefits remained bipartisan even when the
negative consensus briefly gave way to momentum for benefits expansion in
1988, when Congress passed the ill-fated catastrophic health insurance
program. Conservative Republican President Ronald Reagan sponsored the
largest expansion of benefits in Medicare history3° and Congress eventually
enacted this expansion with bipartisan support.31 When Congress repealed the
catastrophic insurance legislation only sixteen months after its adoption, it did
so again with bipartisan support.32
Financing policy demonstrated a similar pattern of consensus. Medicare's
drafters largely copied its financing arrangements from Social Security,
including a payroll tax-based trust fund for hospitalization insurance and
reliance on long-term actuarial forecasting. However, spending on medical
care proved much more volatile and therefore more difficult to project than
spending on pensions. The trust fund system in Social Security had produced
programmatic stability and frequent surpluses during the program's first three
decades.33 The same system applied to Medicare created the potential for
frequent shortfalls and intermittent trust fund crises.
3 4
It is a sign of the strength of consensual politics in Medicare that the first
two shortfalls, in the early 1970s and again in the early 1980s, generated
relatively little controversy. Trust fund shortfalls provided policymakers with
extraordinary opportunities to reshape public programs. Invoking the rhetoric
of bankruptcy emphasized an urgency of immediate action to save the program
from crisis. Such rhetoric had the power to weaken the usual barriers, such as
interest group opposition, that normally frustrate program change. So it has
been with Medicare--each of three periods of trust fund shortfalls preceded
substantial reforms of program policy. It is all the more striking, then, that
during the first two of these periods (roughly 1970 to 1972 and 1981 to 1983),
the policy response was largely bipartisan even though the two crises were
30. See RICHARD HIMMELFARB, CATASTROPHIC POLITICS 17 (1995) (discussing President
Reagan's 1983 proposal to expand Medicare coverage to encompass catastrophic health
expenses).
31. See id. at 43 (referring to substantial margins by which Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act of 1988 passed in House and Senate).
32. See id. at 93 (noting that House voted 352 to 63 and Senate voted unanimously to
repeal Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act).
33. See MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 244 (1979) (explaining
that prior to its enactment of Medicare, Congress kept payroll tax rates that financed social
security sufficiently high to cover expenditures and enlarge trust fund).
34. See OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 75 (contending that Social Security model of trust
fund and payroll tax financing has created Medicare system that is inherently vulnerable to
cycles of bankruptcy).
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addressed by very different solutions (professional self-regulation in 1972 and
centralized price administration in 1983)."5 These two shortfalls had a
relatively low volume of crisis language. "Bankruptcy" rhetoric appeared much
less frequently to describe Medicare's fiscal condition situation in these years
than during the Social Security crisis of 1981 or the Medicare crisis of 1995.
Throughout the 1980s, Medicare trust fund shortfalls were, in a crucial sense,
consensual crises.
Finally, the politics of Medicare reform regarding regulation of medical
providers has also been largely consensual. In the case of the Prospective
Payment System for hospitals in 1983 and the Medicare Fee Schedule for
physicians in 1989, conservative Republican presidents joined congressional
Democrats in adopting strong regulation of federal payments for medical care
in order to slow the rate of growth in program expenditures.16 Fiscal pressures
from the budget deficit catalyzed this support: conservatives paradoxically
supported expanding the scope of government authority in order to reduce the
size of government spending. This bipartisanship was, in the case of Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs), nourished by an important political attribute: the
capacity to appeal simultaneously to multiple, and indeed seemingly
incompatible, political constituencies. DRGs promised to regulate hospitals
and control Medicare spending, but to do so by promoting competition and
rewarding efficiency. They consequently held political appeal for both liberals
and conservatives, creating a bipartisan foundation of support.
Along with the Medicare Fee Schedule, the introduction of the Prospective
Payment System reversed Medicare's original payment policy, borrowed from
private insurance, of paying hospitals and physicians retrospectively,
generously, and with no questions asked. This system was, in effect, a blank
check that medical providers were only too happy to cash during the program's
first two decades. When the federal deficit rose sharply in the 1980s, however,
Medicare's accommodation of hospitals and physicians became untenable. The
result was a quiet revolution in Medicare policy, as Congress adopted
groundbreaking reforms with little controversy, relative speed, and substantial
agreement between the parties.
35. See id. at 106 (noting that, during Medicare financing crises of 1962-1972 and 1982-
1984, both political parties remarkably agreed on how to manage financing problems).
36. See DAVID SMITH, PAYING FOR MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF REFORM 47 (1992) (stating
that "almost everyone in Congress wanted a prospective payment system," and noting
extraordinarily rapid progression of proposal through Congress); James Morone et al.,
Slouching to National Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 263, 263-64 (1985) (discussing
Diagnosis Related Groups as attempt by government to cut Medicare costs). See generally
Lawrence D. Brown et al., Technocratic Corporatism and Administrative Reform in American
Medicine, J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 579 (1985).
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The 1980s regulatory reforms brought Medicare closer to the
"international standard" in health care insurance. 37  Stripped of their
technocratic language, scientific veneers, and appeal to market efficiency,
DRGs and RBRVS38 were essentially blunt instruments of prospective
budgeting and price regulation. The health economist Uwe Reinhardt noted
that postwar health policy in OECD nations can generally be divided into two
eras: the expenditure-driven policies of 1945 to 1970, during which
governments regarded increasing health expenditures as a public policy
achievement, and therefore did little to control the open-ended costs of medical
care; and the 1970s to present period, when in the face of stagnating economies
and fiscal pressures, governments turned to budget-driven health policies to
contain rising costs.3 9 Since the mid-1970s, Canada and Western European
nations have been increasingly aggressive in controlling spending in their
national health care systems, generally moving from lenient expenditure targets
to caps that set harder limits (with penalties for excess costs) on sectoral
expenditures. The trend has been toward global budgets that prospectively
limit governments' annual health care bill.
Medicare, albeit with less force, moved in the same direction of budget-
driven health policymaking during the 1980s. As the decade proceeded, the
scope of the Medicare program subject to prospective payment and budgeting
expanded.40 However, in contrast to health programs in countries such as
Canada, Medicare never adopted a global budget that limited spending for the
whole program; such controls would have been difficult to impose since
Medicare controlled only a portion of the U.S. health marketplace and was
regarded by supporters as incompatible with universal entitlement (for instance,
tightening payments to medical providers too much might erode the access of
37. See, e.g., JOSEPH WHITE, COMPETING SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS
AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 128-62 (1995) (discussing standards of quality and access in
international health care).
38. DRGs (Diagnostic-Related Groups) are a system of classifying hospital admissions by
a patient's diagnosis. Medicare pays a set fee, prospectively determined, for each DRG
regardless of the actual resources spent on an individual patient's care. The RBRVS (Resource-
Based Relative Value Scale) is a fee schedule for physician services based on the time and
complexity of services and physician practice expenses. As with DRGs, the RBRVS provides
the basis for a prospective fee schedule for Medicare payments to physicians. Both DRGs and
RBRVS were promoted as instruments of rationality and science that would provide more
accurate prices for medical care services, while encouraging efficiency.
39. See generally Uwe Reinhardt, Global Budgeting in German Health Care, DOMESTIC
Arr., Winter 1993, at 159 (describing gradual shift of health care policy in industrialized world
from expenditure-driven financing to budget-driven delivery).
40. See MOON, supra note 19, at 52-77 (describing implementation of Prospective
Payment System and its expansive impact).
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Medicare enrollees to physicians). 41 But, the regulatory mechanisms that
Medicare adopted for physician and hospital payments were unquestionably
similar in motivation and effect to those used abroad, though American political
culture seemed to require their justification in technocratic terms.42
Over time, Medicare looked more and more like single-payor insurance.
Medicare reform through the program's first three decades largely meant
federal regulation of payments to providers. It mirrored the strategies of
administered pricing that other national health systems used. Moreover, the
program's new regulatory regime was modestly successful in restraining
Medicare spending from 1984 to 1991.41 While Medicare's cost savings may
not have been impressive on an international scale, compared to the inflationary
American private insurance market they were downright remarkable. Further,
the American private sector copied Medicare's payment innovations such as the
Relative Value Units used to pay physicians. Not surprisingly, as universal
health insurance returned to the agenda in the early 1990s, some analysts and
politicians, including Congressman Pete Stark (D-Cal.), began to tout Medicare
as a model for national health insurance."4 A reinvigorated and more efficient
Medicare appeared to be a promising model for private sector reform in the
United States.
In sum, Medicare politics from 1966 to 1994 was consensual in two
respects that shaped program reform. First, a de facto political consensus
existed that the federal government should operate Medicare as a public
insurance program. Second, the character of Medicare politics was largely
bipartisan, with both parties generally supporting the same course of action, or,
in the case of benefit expansion, inaction, often in response to fiscal constraints
and pressures. This bipartisan character, in turn, made Medicare politics
mostly quiescent, because conflicts over programmatic philosophy were rare.
41. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 268-79 (2003) (comparing Medicare
to public health systems in other countries that cover their whole population instead of only
indigent persons and thus are able to impose universal budgets and ration supply).
42. In fact, the Medicare RBRVS fee schedule resembled payment schemes used in
Canadian provinces, though the Canadian schedules were derived by negotiation, without the
scientific and technocratic aspiration claimed in the United States.
43. See MOON, supra note 19, at 43 (describing effect of Medicare cost-containment
efforts in early 1980s).
44. See Alissa J. Rubin, Stark's Bill Modeled on Medicare, 52 CONG. Q. 609,609 (1994)
(describing Representative Pete Stark's plan to use Medicare as model for universal
government-run health insurance program).
1107
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1095 (2003)
III. The Unraveling of Consensus, 1995-1997
In 1995, for the first time in over three decades, a high-profile, partisan,
and ideologically divisive debate over first-principles took place in Medicare.
All of the elements that had sustained the consensus in Medicare politics
abruptly unraveled. By returning to the central issue of what form of health
insurance the federal government should provide to the elderly, the 1995 debate
represented a reopening of the Medicare debate of the 1950s and 1960s. Given
the relative stability that characterized Medicare for three decades, it is worth
exploring how and why the Medicare consensus unraveled when it did. The
following section analyzes the combination of long-term forces, short-term
pressures, and contingencies that led to the transformation of Medicare politics.
A. Political Environment
The most obvious, as well as important, precipitating factor in Medicare's
political upheaval was the 1994 congressional elections. 45 Medicare, after all,
had never operated under a Republican Congress during its first three decades
of existence.46 The Republican Party had last held majorities in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate in 1954, a decade before the program's
enactment. Congressional stewardship of Medicare consequently meant
Democratic Party stewardship, notwithstanding an interregnum of Republican
control of the Senate from 1980 to 1986.
The 1994 elections, which brought Republican majorities to both houses
of Congress, produced a radically new political environment for Medicare. The
House of Representatives majority, led by Speaker Newt Gingrich, was
committed to an agenda of assertive conservatism.47 While Ronald Reagan had
helped to redirect political discourse toward conservatism, the new Republican
leadership was not satisfied with rhetorical accomplishments. Instead, it sought
to dramatically change the scope of the federal government by redefining the
terms of federalism and federal budgeting, and by reshaping (and often
dismantling) regulatory and social welfare policies.48
45. See LINDA KILLIAN, THE FRESHM EN 161 (1998) (describing newly elected Republican
Congress's effort to reform Medicare).
46. OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 139.
47. See KILLIAN, supra note 45, at 415-16 (discussing conservative agenda pursued by
Republican congressional majority).
48. See id. at 6 (stating elements of Republican agenda).
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The political world arising from the 1994 elections stood in stark contrast
to the world in which Medicare grew up. Medicare was a programmatic child
of the "Great Society. 4 9  It represented liberalism, federal government
activism, social insurance, and by the early 1990s, aggressive government
regulation of private actors. The 1994 Republican revolution promised
conservatism, decentralization of federal power to the states, the unleashing of
market forces, and deregulation.50 The gap between Medicare's programmatic
character and the prevailing political order after the 1994 elections could hardly
have been greater.
Given the ideological mismatch between the program and the Republican
agenda, it was not surprising that the Republican leadership sought to
restructure Medicare. The decision to pursue Medicare reform was,
nonetheless, a controversial and politically risky one. Republican Party
Chairman Haley Barbour, fearing the political fallout from program reform,
unsuccessfully beseeched Speaker Gingrich to delay plans for Medicare reform
until after the 1996 elections. 5' However, filled with bravado after early
legislative victories in 1995, Gingrich rejected Barbour's advice despite the
recent example of the Clinton Administration's bitter experience with health
care reform. 2 Medicare was simply too critical ideologically and fiscally
(given the Republican agenda of cutting taxes while balancing the budget) to
ignore, despite the political risks.
B. Fiscal Environment
If Medicare grew up in a political world different from 1994 America, the
fiscal world it faced was equally unfamiliar. Congress enacted Medicare in
1965 during a period of prosperity and economic growth when the federal
government did not carry sizable deficits.53 Broad acceptance of payroll taxes
49. See DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, TELL NEWT To SHUT UP 128 (1996)
(noting that federal government implemented Medicare as part of Lyndon Johnson's "Great
Society" program).
50. See KILLIAN, supra note 45, at 5 (listing principles of Republican agenda).
51. See MARANIss & WEISSKOPF, supra note 49, at 131 ("Don't touch Medicare for two
years, Barbour urged the congressional leaders.").
52. See id. at 131 (stating that Republican congressional leaders rejected Barbour's advice
to postpone Medicare reform until after the 1996 elections).
53. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2004-2013 app. F, table I (Jan. 2003) (describing revenues, outlays, surpluses, deficits, and
debt from 1962 to 2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfn?index= 1821 &
sequence=O.
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to finance federal programs existed in American politics. Though some
congressional leaders on Social Security, such as Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Wilbur Mills, voiced concern that payroll taxes not become too
burdensome, such opposition had little influence as social insurance benefits
consistently expanded during the 1960s and early 1970s. s During Medicare's
first financing shortfall both parties supported raising the program's
hospitalization insurance tax to help redress the shortfall."5
Medicare's fiscal environment began to change with "stagflation" in the
1970s and the rise of the federal deficit as an issue in the 1980s. Preoccupation
with balancing the federal budget fundamentally changed Medicare's political
position. High rates of growth in program spending, which had been
overlooked in fatter financial times, were no longer easily tolerated. Medicare
was now viewed as a chief culprit in the federal budget deficit, its expenditures
a prime target for deficit reduction. Cuts in program spending, as well as
enactment of regulatory reforms, became a regular feature of the budget
process.
At the same time, the politics of the payroll tax had also changed. Deficit
politics accompanied a parallel rise in antitax sentiment. The Republican Party
made opposition to new taxes a political mantra, one that the Democratic Party
only weakly challenged. The conservative Republican majorities of 1995, still
seething over George Bush's 1990 betrayal of his "no new taxes" pledge and
advancing a tax cut agenda of their own, had no appetite for raising payroll
taxes. For Medicare, the consequence was that if a trust fund shortfall
appeared, it would not be redressed, as it had in the past, by tax increases and
therefore would require radical reform options that promised large savings.
This antitax sentiment, though, did not clearly reflect public opinion; there
was, in fact, reason to believe that the public would have accepted increases in
Medicare payroll taxes.5 6 It is certainly difficult to imagine that a payroll tax
increase for one of the nation's most popular public programs supported by
both political parties would not have been accepted by a majority of the public.
But that support was not forthcoming. The Republicans were ideologically
opposed to tax increases and the Democrats, still trying to escape the
stigmatizing "tax and spend" label, were politically unwilling to challenge
them. The resulting political cap on Medicare payroll taxes put the program in
54. See JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE
STATE, 1945-1975, at 324 (1998) (noting legislative enactments between 1969 and 1971 which
increased Social Security benefits).
55. OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 96.
56. See id. at 143 (discussing evidence indicating that public would tolerate higher taxes
to support Medicare).
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a financial box. Without additional tax revenue, a shortfall in program finances
was inevitable through cuts or restructuring. Fiscally, Medicare's environment
was conducive to programmatic upheaval and the Republican leadership's
agenda of tax cuts and a balanced budget, to be funded in no small part through
cuts in Medicare spending, made that upheaval a certainty in 1995.
C. Intergenerational Equity
Nowhere was Medicare's changed political environment more apparent
than in the transformation of the elderly's public image. During the 1960s, the
elderly were the country's sympathetic social group nonpareil. The public
perceived the elderly as poorer, less well insured, and sicker than younger
Americans." And, they were.s8 Indeed, their ability to command public
sympathy was the reason that Medicare's architects chose to start national
health insurance with a program for the aged.
Three decades later the political appeal of the elderly had eroded. Public
support for programs directed at the aged remained high. 9 However, this
support coexisted with a rising discourse of intergenerational equity concerns
that reinvented the elderly as a "scapegoat" in American politics.6° The success
of federal programs had reduced elderly poverty rates to levels below that of the
general population, though many elders lived just above the poverty line.61
Yet, resentment at the share of the federal budget devoted to the elderly helped
feed a new stereotype: that of the "greedy geezer" who was, depending on the
story, either spending younger taxpayers' dollars on an extravagant retirement,
or on expensive high-tech medicine in the final days of life, or perhaps on both,
thus taking potential funds away from public spending on children and needy
Americans.62 Many viewed the "greedy geezer," in contrast to his or her 1960s
57. See MARMOR, supra note 13, at I I (noting public perception during the 1960s of
elderly persons as having more financial and health problems than most Americans).
58. See id. (citing statistical data supporting 1960s perception of elderly persons).
59. See COOK ET AL., supra note 17, at 63 (noting public opinion poll weighing support
for social welfare programs aiding elderly persons).
60. See Robert H. Binstock, The Aged as Scapegoat, 23 THE GERONTOLOGIST 136 (1983)
(stating that society perceives elderly persons as social and political burdens).
61. See MARILYN MOON& JANEMARIEMULVEY, ENTITLEMENTS ANDTHE ELDERLY 14-19
(1996) (discussing decline in poverty rates among some elderly Americans).
62. See generally Samuel Preston, Children and the Elderly: Divergent Paths for
America's Dependents, 21 DEMOGRAPHY 435 (1984) (offering thesis that increases in life
expectancy of elderly population combined with declining birth rates will, due to America's
social program priorities, result in increased child poverty); see also DANIEL CALLAHAN,
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elderly cousin, as wealthier and better insured than other Americans, and as
media images of active elders suggested, increasingly healthy as well. The
repeal of catastrophic health insurance in 1989 also fueled this stereotype as the
media zeroed in on stories of more affluent elders selfishly leading the charge
against a program that would benefit poorer Medicare beneficiaries (though the
actual story of the demise of catastrophic insurance was much more complex).
Meanwhile, the coming retirement of the baby boomers in the twenty-first
century increasingly became an object of anxiety in public discourse. Critics
such as former Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson, founding president of
the Concord Coalition, alleged that Social Security and Medicare would soon
represent an unsustainable burden on the federal budget, leaving future
generations to cope with enormous public deficits and economic disaster.63
Medical ethicist Daniel Callahan argued that norms of justice dictated that
society should ration health care for the aged by setting age limits on eligibility
for expensive medical treatments.64 Political commentators warned that the
graying of the population would make the already powerful elderly lobby,
symbolized by the persistently vilified American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), even more powerful, institutionalizing an imbalanced political system
that favored the needs of the elderly over other constituencies.6' And finally,
critics wondered why, in the face of declining poverty rates among the elderly,
taxes of working families should finance public health and pension benefits for
well-off elders.66
There are, to be sure, significant problems with the intergenerational
67equity story and the dire warnings about the baby boomers. Comparative
SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 115-16 (1987) (noting that growing
social and economic costs of health care for elderly citizens places economic pressures and
burdens on government and society).
63. See PETER PETERSON, WILL AMERICA GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD? 11-14(1996)
(stating that failure to reform Social Security and Medicare will result in "a political, financial,
and moral crisis").
64. See CALLAHAN, supra note 62, at 116-20 (proposing standard for rationing health care
based on age limits).
65. See KEN DYCHTWALD, AGE POWER: HOW THE 21 ST CENTURY WILL BE RULED BY THE
NEW OLD 1 (1999) (predicting that "the epicenter of economic and political power will shift
from the young to the old").
66. See PETERSON, supra note 63, at 123 (describing reluctance of middle-class
Americans to contribute to government programs that support retirees who might be financially
well-off).
67. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Great Social Security Scare, in
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 31 (noting pessimistic outlook of media sources
regarding future of Social Security); Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan B. Oberlander,
Rethinking Medicare Reform, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 52, 53 (discussing instability of
Medicare and possible solutions); Jill Quadagno, Generational Equity and the Politics of the
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experience in demography, medical care costs, and pensions suggests a less
fearsome outcome of the aging of America than the apocalyptic scenarios that
some analysts predict. But the intergenerational story need not be accurate in
order to be politically influential. Although public opinion studies find mass
support for Medicare and Social Security to be consistently high over time,
these same studies also find that support for government programs for the aged
is noticeably weaker among members of Congress than among the public.68
Among many policymakers, sympathy for the elderly has eroded over the past
three decades. Intergenerational equity concerns and worries over the fiscal
and economic impact of the soon retiring baby-boomers have predisposed
policymakers to cut Medicare spending, impose costs on program beneficiaries,
and restructure existing programmatic arrangements. In 1995 and beyond,
politicians were more prepared than ever before to do something to the elderly
rather thanfor them and were more willing to consider proposals that departed
from the strict universalist ethos of Medicare that provides all beneficiaries the
same benefit package regardless of income.
D. Changing Health Care System
The promise of Medicare was to bring the elderly into the mainstream of
American medicine. In 1965, that meant the traditional health insurance model
(along the lines of Blue Cross/Blue Shield) that commanded an overwhelming
share of the private insurance market. Alternative delivery systems, such as
prepaid group practices (what we now call HMOs) were rare, geographically
limited in market presence, and organized medicine strongly opposed their
inclusion in Medicare. Medicare's adoption of the prevailing model of
insurance thereby not only assured retirees continuity in medical care, as well
as broad access to mainstream hospitals and doctors, but it also reassured the
medical profession that the federal government would not disrupt conditions in
the private medical market---conditions that clearly favored the profession.69
Welfare State, 17 POL. & Soc'y 353, 353-55 (1989) (discussing intergenerational equity and
impact of Americans for Generational Equity (AGE)); JoHN A. PALMER & ISABEL V. SAWHILL,
THE VULNERABLE 420-24 (1988) (discussing social policy concerns regarding support of elderly
persons); Carroll Estes, Social Security: The Social Construction of a Crisis, 61 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 441, 446 (1983) (describing social perception of elderly persons as
blameworthy for economic problems).
68. See CooK ET AL., supra note 17, at 89-91 (analyzing statistical data comparing public
support for Medicare with congressional support for Medicare).
69. Those conditions included retrospective, fee-for-service reimbursement with few
controls over fees; unquestioned physician autonomy in clinical decision-making; the absence of
closed panels of medical providers; and the absence of any countervailing power, public or
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This structure of federal health insurance for the aged essentially remained
stable for three decades. The same cannot be said for private health insurance.
By 1995, the private health insurance market was in the midst of a dramatic
transformation as "managed care" plans and practices became the dominant
form of insurance in the United States.70 The diversity of health plans, payment
practices, and organizational features grouped under the managed care rubric
made the term virtually impossible to define. In practice, managed care
referred to a staggering number of insurance models and policies that departed
from traditional American insurance arrangements. Managed care plans,
including Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs), and hybrid Point of Service (POS) plans grew rapidly
during the 1990s. In 1992, HMOs' enrollment stood at forty million and PPOs
at fifty million; only three years later HMOs covered sixty million Americans
and PPOs another ninety million.7 ' At the same time, the number of physicians
subject to capitation (flat payment per enrollee) and utilization review of
clinical decision-making rose substantially. 2 Surely the most striking symbol
of change, however, was the steep decline of enrollment in America's
traditional health plan, conventional indemnity insurance, from covering 49%
of the employee market in 1992 to only 27% in 1995. 73
In fact, by the middle of the 1990s, only one significant bastion of
unmanaged care remained in the United States: Medicare.74 During the
program's first two decades, efforts existed to expand the role of HMOs in
Medicare. The 1972 Social Security Amendments authorized federal payments
to federally qualified HMOs enrolling program beneficiaries. 7' But HMOs
private, that actively challenged physicians' hold over the medical marketplace. See PAUL STAR,
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 375 (1982) (discussing physicians'
dominance of medical marketplace).
70. See WALTER A. ZELMAN & ROBERT A. BERENSON, THE MANAGED CARE BLUES AND
How TO CURE THEM 53-63 (1998) (describing rise of HMOs and PPOs as price competitive
alternatives in high cost environment and their effects on health care practices).
71. Mark A. Peterson, Health Care into the Next Century, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'v & L.
291, 297 (1997).
72. Id.
73. See Gail Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in
the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 125, 126 (discussing growth of workers enrolled in
various types of health care plans).
74. In the 1990s, Medicaid, adopted at the same time as Medicare and along the same
insurance model, was moving aggressively towards managed care, as more and more states in
search of cost savings mandated that program recipients join HMOs and other managed care
arrangements. See MICHAEL S. SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH REFORM
152-81 (1996) (laying out history of how Medicaid clients were moved into managed care).
75. See Jonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Care and Medicare Reform, 22 J. HEALTH
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regarded the administrative and financial requirements for participation in
Medicare as so onerous that, by 1979, only one prepaid plan had enrolled in the
program. In 1982, policymakers revisited Medicare HMOs and, under the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), adopted provisions intended to
encourage Medicare HMO enrollment. Managed care enrollment in Medicare
subsequently grew, yet in 1993 it stood at only 5% of program beneficiaries.76
As a consequence, by 1995, Medicare's managed care enrollment lagged
far behind that in the private sector. Medicare had promised to bring the
elderly into the mainstream of American medicine and health insurance but that
mainstream had undergone substantial changes while Medicare had not. The
widening gap between the private sector and federal health insurance was not
lost on conservative reformers, who increasingly regarded Medicare as
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee Bill Thomas
bluntly put it, a "dinosaur" that was becoming obsolete because of market
innovations.77
The divergence in insurance structure between Medicare and the private
sector created a number of pressures on the program. Medicare is in a unique-
position internationally. In other nations, government-sponsored health
programs commonly operate alongside a small private health sector that acts as
a safety valve for more affluent citizens seeking shorter queues or greater
amenities. In systems such as the British National Health Service (NHS), the
size of the private sector is a matter of political dispute, but even after some
growth, the public NHS remains the dominant institution in medical care
delivery.78
Medicare's position vis-i-vis the private insurance market is rather
different. Because the United States has never enacted national health
insurance, Medicare operates as a minority insurer alongside a dominant system
of private insurance. This arrangement, directly opposite from the international
POL., POL'Y & L. 595,598 (1997) (describing 1972 Social Security amendments that authorized
Medicare to contract with certain older, established HMOs "on a capitated or 'risk' basis").
76. See HEALTH CARE FINANcING ADMINISTRATION, A PROFILE OF MEDICARE: CHARTBOOK
1998, at 64, fig. 42 (1998) (showing increased enrollment in Medicare HMOs from 1985 to
1997) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Oberlander, supra note 75, at
598 (noting increase in number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans
following passage of TEFRA risk program).
77. See Robin Toner, G.O.P. Moves Health Debate to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1995, at A26 (recounting Chairman of House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health Bill
Thomas's description of Medicare as "dinosaur").
78. See RUDOLF KLEIN, THE POLITICS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 145-58 (1989)
(discussing size and scope of British National Health Services in relation to private health care
providers).
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standard, creates a set of potential pressures on Medicare when it diverges from
the dominant private model of medical insurance. As managed care advanced
in the 1990s, those pressures were fully unleashed.
The first pressure is that of performance. If the private insurance model is
viewed as outperforming Medicare, for example in controlling costs, pressures
will urge Medicare to follow the private sector lead in health care organization
and payment practices. As the next section explains, performance pressures
were particularly salient in the mid-1990s as managed care provided
conservative reformers with an alternative to traditional Medicare. The second
pressure is that of consistency. As the mainstream of medical care moves,
pressures may urge Medicare to maintain the continuity between employee and
retiree coverage. Concerns may also develop about the administrative costs of
maintaining Medicare as a different health insurance system and about potential
resentment from the public due to intergenerational equity concerns. For
instance, Brookings Institution economists Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer
have written that Medicare must emulate the private sector's move toward
managed care because if it does not, "public support may begin to erode for a
system of coverage for the aged and disabled that is substantially different from
and, therefore, more costly, than the health plans that cover the average
taxpayer's family.
7 9
Finally, Medicare may be subject to the pressures of expansion. As
insurers exhaust options for growth in the private sector, they may look to the
public sector to expand their market share. In this context, Medicare
represented "the last frontier" for managed care companies, and as such, they
fought to expand their enrollment of program beneficiaries, which meant
lobbying for reforms that would open up Medicare more widely to private
insurers. In all of these dimensions, the development of managed care in the
private sector brought about enormous political pressures on Medicare.
E. Trust Fund Crisis
Past trust fund shortfalls in Medicare proved to be largely
noncontroversial, low-profile, and bipartisan. The trust fund crisis of 1995
produced very different politics. This crisis was contested, the first in program
history, and it shattered the consensus that had defined Medicare politics for
three decades.
79. Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, Rethinking Medicare Reform Needs
Rethinking, HEALTH Asr., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 69, 69.
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The 1995 trust fund crisis was, in part, happenstance. The Republican
leadership was searching for ways to sell its Medicare reform package. Coming
on the heels of the demise of President Clinton's health plan, the political risk
in taking on Medicare should have been abundantly clear. But fiscally, the
Republican Party needed Medicare savings to accomplish its goals of balancing
the budget and cutting taxes. Ideologically, Medicare reform was central to
Republican efforts to remake the welfare state. The question remained: how
could the Republican Party convince the country that its vision of Medicare
reform would help, not hurt, the program?
As party pollsters tested various Medicare marketing messages,
Republican Party Chairman Haley Barbour thought he had found the answer in
a report which showed that, in the absence of corrective action, the Medicare
hospitalization insurance trust fund would run a deficit beginning in 2002.80
Politically, the Republican leadership saw the report as a godsend; they could
now advance Republican reforms as necessary to "saving Medicare" from
"bankruptcy."'" The trust fund shortfall offered, in other words, a convenient
problem to which Republican lawmakers could attach the solution that they
already had in mind.
Focusing attention on Medicare's trust fund problems also had the
potential to change the dynamics of the Medicare reform debate. Medicare's
cost control performance, as previously noted, was fairly strong in the 1980s.
However, the world of actuaries is one of long-term projections. Federal
actuaries compute Medicare financing over periods of twenty-five and seventy-
five years. These long-term estimates offer very little policy value given the
enormous uncertainty about future rates of medical costs, medical practice and
technology, health of the population, and the impact of program reforms. But,
for the Republican leadership, these limitations would have been of no concern
because the actuarial estimates offered an important political advantage: the
longer the projection went, the worse Medicare's financial problems looked, in
part because such estimates assumed no increases in payroll tax rates or
adoption of reforms, and in part because no public program is fully funded
seven decades ahead of time.82 The outlook on Medicare's trust fund for 2002
may have appeared bleak, but the outlook for 2032 seemed downright
80. See MARANISS & WEISSKOPF, supra note 49, at 133 (stating that Barbour regarded
1995 Medicare report as "manna from heaven").
81. See id. at 132-33 (describing Republican reaction to contents of "[t]he 1995 Annual
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund").
82. See JOSEPH WHITE, FALSE ALARM: WHY THE GREATEST THREAT TO SOCIAL SECURITY
AND MEDICARE IS THE CAMPAIGN TO "SAVE" THEM 10-12 (2001) (describing long-term
assumptions used in Medicare budget projections).
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catastrophic. Moreover, the projections picked up the retirement of the baby
boomers, allowing Republican (and some Democratic) policyrnakers to connect
Medicare reform to anxiety about the aging of the country and the affordability
of entitlements. Suddenly, the concern was not just that the Medicare trust
fund would soon go bankrupt, but also that Medicare would soon bankrupt the
government. Actuarial projections provided an indictment of Medicare on the
basis of its future performance and thereby changed the focus of public
discourse. The argument was that Medicare reform would be necessary to save
the program (and the federal budget) from an inadequate performance in cost
control that had not yet occurred.
If the timing of the trust fund shortfall was convenient for Republican
lawmakers, its coincidence with a rise in Medicare spending rates relative to the
private sector was pure political manna. The adoption of regulatory reforms
during the 1980s had left Medicare with stricter payment policies than private
insurers. From 1984 to 1991, Medicare costs rose at rates slower than those in
the private sector. 3 As the 1990s wore on, the pattern reversed and suddenly it
was Medicare that appeared to be the weaker agent of cost control. The spread
of managed care arrangements and newly aggressive competition in the health
insurance market had lowered, temporarily as it turned out, the rate of increase
in private sector health costs.8 4 Meanwhile, Medicare costs resumed a higher
rate of growth, driven by substantial increases in spending for postacute care
and unexpected increases in spending for hospital services.8 5
Medicare became financially vulnerable at precisely the same moment that
it became politically vulnerable. Republican lawmakers pointed to the private
sector's lower rates of growth as evidence that Medicare was inefficient,
especially in comparison to innovative managed care and competitive
contracting strategies. They argued that Medicare's regulatory framework of
"price controls," as it was derogatorily known, had failed, and that the program
should instead adopt successful "market-based" strategies.
8 6
83. See MooN, supra note 19, at 43 (discussing rate of growth of Medicare costs).
84. See CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, DATA BULLETIN No. 13: DESPITE
FEARS, COSTS RISE ONLY MODESTLY IN 1998 (Fall 1998) (showing data on growth in private
sector health premiums during early 1990s), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT
/84/#graph 1.
85. MEDICARE AYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, NATIONAL HEALTH CARE AND MEDICARE
SPENDING DATA BOOK § 5, chart 5-5 (2003) (comparing average cost increase per enrollee in
Medicare versus private sector), at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/.
86. Of course, the "inefficient" Medicare "price controls" denounced in the 1990s (DRGs
and RBRVS) were the same policies that were promoted in the 1980s as fostering competition
and efficiency in the medical care market.
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In large part, however, the resurgence of Medicare spending was due, not
to the failure of regulation, but to the failure to implement a full-scale
regulatory scheme. The reforms of the 1980s were sectoral, targeting hospital
and physician spending. Other sectors, such as home health care, were left
essentially unregulated. As providers figured out how to shift services (and
thus profits) into unregulated areas of the program, an increasing share of
program spending was uncontrollable, not subject to prospective budgeting.
Moreover, the 1980s regulatory reforms did not impose a prospective limit on
total Medicare spending, such as through a global budget of the sort used in
Canada.17 Without a global budget, Medicare was inevitably susceptible to
unforeseen increases in spending. When a high rate of growth existed in any
one program sector, no hard cap existed to compensate for it by limiting overall
program spending. And, because it only covered a portion of the American
population, Medicare lacked a crucial cost containment tool used in other
national health systems: limits on the diffusion of medical technology. As a
consequence of its half-way regulatory reforms, Medicare had, in a sense, the
worst of both worlds: enough regulation to serve as a political scapegoat, but
not enough to ensure successful cost control.
The Republican attempt to use the trust fund shortfall in 1995 to push
through program reforms was nothing new. During the early 1970s and 1980s,
policymakers had pursued the same strategy. What was new, however, was the
scope of the Republican-sponsored reforms and their expected impact on
beneficiaries' medical care. The proposed cuts in the rate of growth in
Medicare spending ($270 billion over seven years, a 30% reduction) were
substantial.8" The Republican legislation also proposed a transformation of
Medicare's budgetary entitlement status by introducing a hard cap on annual
expenditures. The plan also called for a restructuring of Medicare insurance by
opening the program up to a host of private insurance plans that lawmakers
hoped would increase the elderly's enrollment in managed care at the expense
of public Medicare.89 Taken together, these reforms had the potential to impact
program beneficiaries profoundly, a considerable departure from previous trust
fund remedies that had raised taxes and targeted medical care providers.
87. See WHTE, supra note 37, at 66-70 (describing Canadian practice of making lump-
sum allocations to hospitals and subsequently requiring hospitals to adhere to budget controls).
88. See Colette Fraley, Republicans Outline Medicare Plan... To Hit $270 Billion
Budget Target, 53 CONG. Q. 2780, 2780 (1995) (discussing Republican plan to reduce Medicare
spending by $270 billion).
89. See id. at 2780-81 (describing Republican plan to give beneficiaries option to leave
Medicare and opt for managed care).
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As a result, the Republicans overreached in their reform effort,
miscalculating that the rhetoric of trust fund crisis would inoculate them from
political damage. As Clinton's health plan had done only two years earlier, the
Republican Medicare plan became a political "boomerang."90 President
Clinton, who had been searching for relevance after the humbling 1994
elections, seized on the issue, vowing he would veto the bill and that he would
"not let [the Republican Party] destroy Medicare." 9' Congressional Democrats
similarly found a unified opposition voice in decrying the Republican Medicare
proposal as turning back, in the words of House Minority Whip David Bonior,
"30 years of trust and 30 years of hope that our parents and our grandparents
will always have the health care they need. " 92
Despite the controversy, Republican congressional leaders succeeded in
passing a Medicare reform bill.93 But, the Democrats' so-called "Mediscare"
campaign took a toll, and the issue played no small part in rehabilitating
President Clinton's political standing and in cementing the Republican
Congress's image as too extreme. When the President vetoed the Medicare bill
with the same pen that Lyndon Johnson had used to sign Medicare into law in
1965, program reform appeared dead. The 1996 Clinton campaign's successful
use of the Medicare issue against Republican nominee Robert Dole (who had
voted against the original Medicare legislation) did nothing to persuade
otherwise.
IV. The Rise of the Market Model: Medicare and the 1997 Balanced
Budget Act
The defeat of the 1995 Republican Medicare reform bill obscured the
powerful long-term and short-term forces that were undermining the old
program consensus. Electoral outcomes had placed ideological opponents of
Medicare's liberal model into positions of influence in Congress. The rise of
90. See THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: THE RISE AND RESOUNDING DEMISE OF THE
CLINTON HEALTH PLAN 178 (1996) (using "political boomerang" metaphor to describe failure of
President Clinton's Health Security proposal).
91. See Colette Fraley, Historic House Medicare Vote Affirms GOP Determination, 53
CONG. Q. 3206, 3206 (1995) (noting President Clinton's reaction to Republican Medicare
reform bill).
92. See id. at 3210 (discussing Democrats' criticism of Republican Medicare reform
efforts).
93. See David E. Rosenbaum, Battle over the Budget: The Details, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1995, at Al (describing government "shutdown" controversy and passage of Republican
balanced budget bill that would limit Medicare spending).
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managed care created a powerful constituency in the private sector for ceding
Medicare's public insurance function to the market. Medicare remained a
prime fiscal target as momentum for balancing the federal budget increased.
How much the liberal consensus had unraveled became apparent in the
aftermath of the 1996 elections. In August of the following year, Congress and
the President agreed on the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). The 1997
BBA mandated a wide variety of key policy changes, including a balanced
federal budget by 2002.94 The BBA also kept alive the practice, which had
been prominent in the previous decade, of adopting Medicare reform as a part
of large-scale fiscal legislation. Among the BBA provisions was a series of
Medicare reforms and substantial cuts in the rate of growth in Medicare
spending over the next decade.95  The legislation also established the
"Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare" to consider the program's
future (which would, in 1999, fail to produce the super-majority necessary to
officially forward its recommendations to Congress).96 But, the centerpiece of
the reforms was the creation of a new Medicare+Choice option that opened
Medicare up to a variety of new private insurance plans, including Medical
Savings Accounts, commercial Fee-for-Service plans, Provider-Sponsored
Organizations, and the full gamut of managed care plans.97
The changes in Medicare attracted, in comparison to the high-profile
Medicare debate of 1995, relatively little public attention or press scrutiny.98
Indeed, most of the coverage of the 1997 reforms focused on controversial
measures that ultimately did not pass Congress. These included provisions to
raise Medicare's retirement age and income-related beneficiary premiums. 99
The dearth of attention to what did pass in 1997 was largely a function of
the bipartisan agreement on these changes. There simply was no echo of the
deeply partisan and highly charged 1995 atmosphere in deliberations over the
Medicare+Choice arrangements. In June 1997, in a telling show of
bipartisanship, the House Ways and Means Committee approved the
Republican-sponsored Medicare reforms 36-3, while the Senate Finance
94. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BALANCED BUDGET Acr OF
1997, at 1 (1997).
95. Id. at 17.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 16 (describing options available to Medicare beneficiaries under
Medicare+Choice plans).
98. See Lynn Etheredge, The Medicare Reforms of 1997: Headlines You Didn't Read, 23
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 573, 574 (1998) (stating that Medicare reform process "mostly took
place outside the media spotlight").
99. The fact that Congress openly considered these measures was a significant
development in Medicare politics in and of itself.
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Committee voted for them20-O, a far cry from the polarizing partisanship and
party-line voting on Medicare reform in 1995.100 The final conference report
containing the Medicare legislation similarly cleared the House of
Representatives 346-85 and the Senate 85-15.101 One prominent participant
declared that, after the ill will of the 1995 Medicare debate, enactment of the
BBA was "a bipartisan miracle.'
0 2
Yet, for all the apparent bipartisanship, the stakes were still high. Taken
together, the 1997 Medicare reforms arguably represented the most important
changes in the program since its inception. The scope of agreement on these
reforms, and the consequent absence of public debate, was remarkable because
the Medicare BBA provisions resembled, in key respects, the Republican plan
that had died amidst all the controversy just the year before.
Why the abrupt political turnabout? First, the 1997 BBA omitted or
altered several key provisions that had been the focus of Democratic Party
objections, including a hard cap on Medicare spending that would have
transformed the program's budgetary entitlement status and a fail-safe
provision that would have triggered automatic spending cuts in the program.
Democrats widely viewed such a cap as threatening the ability of seniors to
access quality medical care, and as incompatible with Medicare's social
contract and American conceptions of entitlement. Moreover, they believed
(with good reason, given stated Republican aims and the probable impact of the
proposed reforms) that the program cap and fail-safe provision would starve
traditional Medicare of beneficiaries and providers, who would both have
financial incentives to move into managed care plans. Managed care
organizations, in turn, would be guaranteed a larger piece of program spending.
In short, traditional Medicare would potentially be devastated by the spending
cap. Without its omission, broad Democratic support for the legislation simply
would not have been forthcoming in 1997. In addition, the spending cuts
adopted in 1997 were less than those initially sought by the Republican
leadership, making them more palatable to Democratic members of Congress
and the President, who viewed the 1995 cuts as unrealistically high. The 1997
BBA was consequently not as ambitious as the 1995 Republican Medicare
reform proposals. Still, by embracing Medicare+Choice, Republicans saw the
100. See Charles N. Kahn Ill & Hanns Kuttner, Budget Bills and Medicare Policy: The
Politics of the BBA, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 37, 43 ("[C]onsensus characterized the
1997 BBA as much as conflict had the 1995 BBA.").
101. Jerry Gray, The Budget Deal: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at A22.
102. Kahn & Kuttner, supra note 100, at 37.
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BBA as "moving the ball a great deal down the field towards their goal of a
competitive Medicare market."' 03
Second, as the electoral glare of 1996 receded, the extent to which
President Clinton and the Republican Congress shared common ground on
crucial elements of health reform became clear. The President's opposition to
the 1995 legislation focused on the size of spending cuts, not the proposed
structural changes in Medicare insurance that opened the program up to private
insurers. The Republican Medicare proposals ironically followed an approach
similar to the managed competition blueprint for health care reform that the
Clinton health plan proposed. Managed competition seeks to control health
care costs by having patients pay the costs of choosing more expensive health
plans that compete in a regulated private market. In the end, President Clinton
was hard-pressed to oppose a plan for Medicare reform that reflected his own
preferred model of health care reform. And, as managed care arrangements
advanced in the private sector and appeared to outperform Medicare, a growing
number of congressional Democrats supported the goal of expanding managed
care in the program as a remedy to the program's financing problems and
benefit limitations."' 4 The fact that the 1997 reforms retained the commitment
to a Fee-for-Services (FFS) option made it easier for the Clinton Administration
and liberal Democrats in Congress to support this version of competition. °0
This option meant that beneficiaries would not suffer undue pressures,
including financial penalties, for staying in traditional Medicare rather than
enrolling in managed care.
Crucially, the 1997 reforms represented something of a legislative wishing
well: different interests and political factions saw in the legislation what they
wanted to see. But, their visions were quite different. For Republicans,
conservative Democrats, and the managed care industry, the 1997 Medicare
reforms represented an important move toward transforming Medicare into a
competitive market-a managed competition system that embraced managed
care. Some liberals saw it differently. For example, Pete Stark, who was a key
Democratic figure on Medicare policy, predicted that the legislative provisions
intended to accelerate managed care and introduce competition into Medicare
103. Telephone Interview with Charles Kahn, former Staff Director, House Comm. on
Ways and Means; President, Health Association of America (Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Kahn
Interview].
104. Telephone Interview with Bill Vaughan, former Staffmember, House Comm. on Ways
and Means (Feb. I1, 2002) [hereinafter Vaughan Interview].
105. Telephone Interview with Chris Jennings, former Deputy Assistant to President
Clinton, Health Care Policy (Feb. 29, 2002).
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"wouldn't amount to a hill of beans."'10 6 Stark and other Democrats were
therefore willing to vote for legislation that they did not believe would work as
Republicans intended. The BBA thus had broad political appeal because its
impact was sufficiently uncertain to ensure that multiple and even conflicting
political interests could find it acceptable.
Third, and perhaps most critically, deficit pressures continued to shape
Medicare politics. President Clinton's acquiescence in adopting a balanced
budget was a major turning point. While the President regarded the proposed
Republican cuts as excessive, Medicare spending reductions were still essential
to balancing the budget. The President and congressional Democrats may have
had a different vision than Republicans on how to end the federal deficit, but
reducing Medicare spending remained crucial to that vision.
Fourth, by avoiding the block granting of Medicaid, the 1997 BBA
omitted any proposals to limit federal contributions to health insurance for the
poor. The 1995 Medicare reform bill had also targeted Medicaid, and the
President strongly opposed Republican efforts to block grant the program and
loosen government regulations on nursing homes. Immediately after his 1996
re-election, President Clinton was politically stronger than at any point since
1993, and congressional Republicans were forced to compromise with him on
the legislation.
Finally, without the controversies over spending cuts and the budgetary
cap, it was difficult to oppose the rhetorical appeal of the 1997 reforms. After
all, the legislation's managed competition-like provisions proposed to offer
Medicare beneficiaries more choice while at the same time generating
budgetary savings and more competition among insurers. The reforms thus
combined the assurance of fiscal control with the symbolism of individual
empowerment and market efficiency, a powerful appeal in the confines of
American political culture that legislators commonly find difficult to resist.
In short, the 1997 BBA represented at least a temporary reinstatement of
political consensus in Medicare. It also offered a programmatic direction for
Medicare that promised a radical departure from the old program consensus.
The 1997 legislation appeared to mark both the unraveling of Medicare as
single-payor insurance and the transformation of Medicare from a health
insurance program into a health insurance market. This change was a profound
one in Medicare's operations. Writing about the significance of the 1997
reforms, health policy analyst Lynn Etheredge declared the transformation of
Medicare into a "consumer-choice" model similar to the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program (long a favorite of managed competition advocates), a
106. Vaughan Interview, supra note 104.
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"watershed" in federal health policy that "ratified the Market Paradigm as
National Policy."'0 7 Etheredge summarized the conventional wisdom among
many supporters of the legislation:
The Medicare legislation brings the nation's largest purchaser of health
care into the new mainstream of managed care plans and competitive
markets. Through a national political process it ratifies market-oriented
approaches as the new national health policy for dealing with health care
costs. This was a political recognition ofjust how well the market-oriented
approach has been working.'
0 r
By opening Medicare up to a host of new private insurance options, the
BBA had the potential to fundamentally alter Medicare's character as a public,
federally-operated insurance program. Public Medicare was now to take its
place among dozens of private plans competing for beneficiaries in a new
Medicare insurance market. 0 9 Over time, experts expected a substantial
number of program beneficiaries to leave traditional Medicare and enroll in
managed care organizations and other private plans offered under
Medicare+Choice. "0 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasted that
by 2002, the BBA would result in 27% of all Medicare beneficiaries being
enrolled in managed care plans, a number projected to increase to 35% by
2005."'1 Beneficiary movement out of traditional Medicare was to be
facilitated by: (1) the annual coordinated open-enrollment period; (2) raising
payments to managed care plans in rural counties that had little success in
attracting Medicare beneficiaries; (3) reducing geographic variation in
payments; and (4) loosening some regulations on health plans." 2 If the
legislation worked as planned, then the philosophy underlying Medicare as well
as program operations would be transformed. Medicare would shift from a
single-payor government insurance program to a federal subsidy program for
private insurance. Over time, many expected that the majority of beneficiaries
would no longer enroll in public Medicare.
107. See Etheredge, supra note 98, at 574-76 (describing fundamental changes in
Medicare program stemming from 1997 Medicare reform legislation).
108. Id. at 576.
109. See id. at 575 (discussing new health insurance market created by 1997 Medicare
reform legislation).
110. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 94, at 28 (describing Congressional Budget
Office projections regarding increase in Medicare+Choice plan enrollment by Medicare
beneficiaries).
111. See id. (estimating percentage of all Medicare beneficiaries that will be enrolled in
capitated plans of Medicare+Choice by 2002 and thereafter).
112. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE PROVISIONS IN THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF
1997.
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This vision of Medicare strongly resembled what opponents of Medicare
had proposed in 1965, a plan in which the role of government would be to
subsidize beneficiary purchases of private insurance, rather than to operate a
government insurance plan. Medicare had, in essence, returned full circle to
the original debate over its enactment, but with a realignment of political forces
that favored market advocates. The features of the new Medicare market as
envisioned by the BBA, with competing private insurance plans, a regulated
marketplace, and an organized shopping period for enrollees, embodied the
principles of managed competition that economist Alain Enthoven had first
articulated. 13 Yet, while managed competition had a strong impact on
Medicare, in one crucial respect the Medicare reforms diverged from traditional
managed competition. Consequently, the ascendance of a new program
consensus did not completely supplant the old Medicare consensus.
The 1997 BBA did not legislate what the Republican leadership had
originally wanted: to convert Medicare into a defined-contribution system.
Under such a system, the federal government would give Medicare enrollees a
fixed dollar amount to choose a health plan; if they chose a plan that cost more
than the value of the government voucher, they would have to pay the
difference themselves. A defined-contribution, or voucher, is a core element of
managed competition because, according to the theory, it generates savings,
allows budgetary certainty, promotes innovation, and creates incentives for
people to choose low-cost (and presumably more efficient) health plans.1 4 In
the case of Medicare, managed competition advocates anticipated that the
impact of a defined-contribution incentive would be to hasten the departure of
enrollees from public Medicare to lower-cost managed care plans.t11
By the mid-I 990s, in additional to a wide range of health policy makers
and analysts, the Congressional Budget Office and the American Medical
Association endorsed the introduction of a defined-contribution system into
Medicare.16 The idea enjoyed considerable support among Republican
113. See generally ALAIN ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO
THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980).
114. Id.
115. Kahn Interview, supra note 103.
116. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE
OPTIONS 423 (1996) (advocating conversion of entire Medicare program to defined-contribution
system as means of reducing spending on program); Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer,
The Medicare Reform Debate: What is the Next Step?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 8, 20-22
(calling for conversion of Medicare system from "service reimbursement system" to "premium
support system," whereby "Medicare would pay a defined sum toward the purchase of an
insurance policy that provided a defined set of services"); Stuart M. Butler & Robert E. Moffitt,
The FEHBP as a Model for a New Medicare Program, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 47,51-59
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congressional majorities and some Democratic conservatives. But, the political
stigma of "voucherizing" Medicare was still sufficiently strong in 1997 that
sponsors left defined-contributions out of the reform package. The omission
had two key consequences. The first was that it lessened the financial pressure
on beneficiaries to leave public Medicare." 7  This decrease in financial
pressure ensured the continuation of large enrollments in the public sector of
the program during the short-term, meaning that traditional Medicare would
remain predominant in the new Medicare market. The second consequence
was that, without defined-contributions, the BBA lacked the key cost control
mechanism of managed competition. Even though the BBA contained much of
the essential managed competition infrastructure, without imposing defined-
contributions and cost consciousness on Medicare beneficiaries, the
competitive dynamics of the system were not fully realized.
Yet, as noted above, the BBA mandated substantial cuts in the rate of
growth in Medicare spending over the next decade."' From where, in the
absence of a competitive dynamic, would the projected savings come? This
question was the ultimate paradox of the 1997 legislation: while the BBA
represented a historic milestone in introducing managed competition to
Medicare, it simultaneously continued the recent process of moving Medicare
closer to the single-payor model. The 1997 legislation substantially increased
the scope of Medicare subject to prospective budgeting by reining in payments
for home health care and skilled nursing facilities." 9 With the addition of these
two sectors of prospective payment, public Medicare came closer than ever to
having a global budget by default. The legislation also linked the growth in
payments for physician services to changes in the gross domestic product, a
potentially stronger brake on program expenditures that resembled cost control
instruments used in other industrial democracies.
While reducing payments to providers under previously established
regulations, these new regulatory reforms generated savings in program
spending, but they did not do so as a result of any procompetitive elements of
the legislation. 2 0 In this sense, the BBA's enactment resembled the enactment
(suggesting that legislators could remedy many problems with Medicare in its current form by
transforming program into defined-contribution system).
117. See Kahn Interview, supra note 103 (explaining that inclusion of defined-contribution
element would cause many to view Medicare as more expensive than managed care insurance
plans).
118. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (describing Balanced Budget Act of
1997).
119. See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text (describing policy changes in
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and their influence in aiming to make Medicare more efficient).
120. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 112.
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of the Prospective Payment System in the 1980s. In 1997, as in 1983, the
rhetoric was all about markets and competition. But, the reality was that the
savings all came from regulation: once again, Medicare talked "right" but
moved "left." The secret of the BBA was that the move to competition was not
projected to save Medicare any money. Given budgetary pressures for
Medicare savings, Republicans and Democrats once again embraced more
regulation and lower payments to providers as the best way to achieve short-
term savings.
In the short-term, Medicare consequently assumed a dual personality,
moving in two directions at once. It embraced the market while continuing the
development of its traditional component into a full-scale single-payor program.
The new coalition in Medicare politics was not sufficiently strong to displace
the old liberal consensus, so it had to build market arrangements on top of the
old regime. Market and regulatory instruments began to share an uneasy co-
existence within the program. Consequently, the future shape of Medicare as a
public program was by no means clear. Would the program's original status as
government-operated social insurance endure, or would Medicare transform
into a full-fledged market of private insurers?
V. The Politics of Prescription Drug Coverage, 2000-2003
The debate over Medicare's future entered electoral politics in 2000,
commanding more attention in a presidential election than at any time since
1964. In a contest between incumbent Democratic Vice-President Al Gore and
Republican Texas Governor George W. Bush that lacked (until election night)
both excitement and compelling candidates, Medicare emerged as a first-order
issue. As the 2000 campaign season got underway, the fiscal environment of
Medicare had fundamentally changed and with it, Medicare's place in
American politics had also changed. In 1998, for the first time in three
decades, the CBO announced a federal budget surplus, 12' forecasting a surplus
of $131 billion for 2000 and $381 billion by 2009.122 The surplus arrived as a
result of the unprecedented period of economic growth in the late 1990s that
filled federal tax coffers and also as a result of the budgetary policies pursued
by President Clinton and Congress. It also heralded a new (albeit very short-
lived) era in Medicare politics, in which the deficit pressures and the zero-sum
121. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LONG-TERM BUDGETARY PRESSURES AND POLICY OPTIONS,
at xv-xvii (1998) (discussing projected federal budgetary surplus).
122. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2000-
2009, at 33 tbl.2-1 (1999).
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politics of the 1980s and 1990s gave way to the friendlier and costlier dynamics
of surplus politics. The trust fund outlook for Medicare was also improving. In
1996, Medicare's Hospitalization Insurance trust fund was predicted to go
insolvent in 2001.'23 By 2000, its estimated date of insolvency had been
pushed back to 2023, the best fiscal situation in which Medicare had been since
1974.124 The improved finances of the program were due to surging revenues
from the growing economy and the greater than anticipated successes of the
1997 regulatory reforms in slowing down Medicare spending. In 1998,
Medicare spending grew by only 1.5% and in 1999 it actually declined for the
first time in program history. The idea that Medicare faced a trust fund crisis,
which had driven program politics since 1995, started to seem far-fetched and
far off in the future.
Two of the most important pressures for fiscal restraint in Medicare,
federal deficits and trust fund shortfalls, were not evident in 2000. As a
consequence, the politics of Medicare in that year's election revolved around
something that had rarely happened in the program's history: a bidding war to
expand benefits. The potential benefit that became the subject of Al Gore and
George W. Bush's attention was prescription drug coverage. Surplus politics
made the rise of prescription drug coverage possible as an issue in Medicare
politics, but that was not its only impetus. The long-standing gap between
Medicare's lack of outpatient coverage and the standard of coverage in the
private sector was growing. Medicare HMOs, an important source of drug
coverage for about 15% of program beneficiaries, were increasingly adopting
tight restrictions on such coverage, for instance, by instituting low ceilings on
the maximum amount that could be covered, or by dropping drug coverage
altogether.121 Similarly, Medigap and supplemental insurance plans that
covered prescription drugs were raising premiums to levels many beneficiaries
could no longer afford. Employer-sponsored drug coverage for seniors
promised to follow a similar trajectory. The erosion of prescription drug
coverage for seniors was largely due to an explosion in drug costs. Though
small as a percentage of overall health care spending in the U.S., spending on
prescription medications rose by 15% from 1997 to 1998, making
pharmaceuticals one of the fastest growing components of national health
123. See Robert Pear, Outlook Better for Social Security and Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 2000, at A18 ("The Medicare fund has gained 22 years of life since 1996, when the
administration predicted that it would run out of money in 2001.").
124. See id. (quoting Health and Human Services Secretary Donna E. Shalala as saying that
Medicare trust fund would not be depleted until 2023).
125. See Gold, supra note I, at W3-176-80 (noting decline in range of coverage and
attractiveness of Medicare HMO plans, including reduction in service areas like drug coverage).
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spending. 126 The increasing costs made Medicare's omission of coverage for
outpatient medications all the more glaring.
Beyond the financial pressures underlying the widening gap between
Medicare and the private standard, the medical implications of that gap seemed
to grow as well, with the promise of a new generation of drugs, reinforced by
an avalanche of advertisements and celebratory media stories about the latest
medical discoveries that made access to these "miracle" drugs seem like a basic
human right. The promised benefits of drugs soon to be generated by research
on the genome only upped the ante, as some observers boldly, and undoubtedly
precipitously, imagined sizable gains in average life expectancy and even "life
without disease."' 2 7 William Schwartz, a prominent health policy analyst and
physician, declared the U.S. on the threshold of a "medical utopia," arguing
that:
[O]ur exploding knowledge of the genetic mechanisms of disease begins to
make plausible the once impossible dream of a largely disease-free
existence... the possibility of a broad-based victory over disease and a
dramatic increase in the human lifespan in the not too remote future must
now be taken seriously.12
8
Thus, the prospects of a genetic revolution on the horizon made it
imperative to extend drug coverage to Medicare. The data was overwhelming:
in 1996, 80% of seniors took medications and seniors filled an average of
twenty prescriptions per year. In a 2000 survey by the Kaiser Family
Foundation, 76% of the public supported "guaranteeing prescription drug
coverage to everyone on Medicare, even if it means more government spending
to pay for it.' 29 Modernizing Medicare had begun to entail benefit expansion
as an integral part of program restructuring.
By 2000, Medicare's promise to bring the elderly into mainstream
medicine appeared to require adding a drug benefit to the program. What form
the benefit would take was an entirely different matter. While both presidential
candidates had joined the "expand Medicare benefits" bandwagon-Bush more
reluctantly than Gore-they offered contrasting plans. Gore proposed a drug
126. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS: A CHART BooK 2 (2000)
(describing dramatic increase in spending on prescription drugs as component of total personal
health care spending during period from 1990 to 2000).
127. See WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, M.D., LIFE WITHOUT DISEASE: THE PURSUIT OF MEDICAL
UTOPIA 1 (1998) (hypothesizing that medical breakthroughs may eventually lead to disease-free
existence for humans).
128. Id.
129. THE NEWsHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER & KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, NATIONAL SURVEY
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 4 (2000).
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benefit (resembling a plan that the Clinton Administration had proposed earlier
in 2000) that was voluntary, universally available to all Medicare beneficiaries,
and would add coverage to the traditional Medicare program, all at an estimated
cost of $338 billion over ten years. 130 Early in the campaign, Bush had suffered
politically because he lacked a prescription drug proposal. Thus, he eventually
countered with a plan that would initially provide block grants to the states to
assist low-income Medicare beneficiaries with drug costs and enrollees with
"catastrophic" costs that totaled more than $6,000 annually; in subsequent
years, coverage would become available through private insurers participating
in Medicare, all at an estimated cost of$158 billion over ten years.' The cost
difference was due to the fact that the benefits in the Bush plan were not as
generous and the eligibility not as comprehensive as that envisioned in the Gore
plan. But in reality, the insurance protection offered by both plans was likely to
disappoint seniors because it left beneficiaries responsible for considerable
costs and paled in comparison to standard benefits in the employer-sponsored
market. In addition, candidate Bush tied his prescription drug plan to a
commitment to comprehensively reform Medicare along the lines
recommended by the 1999 Bipartisan Commission, which had endorsed a
version of managed competition known as "premium support."132  Gore
alternatively proposed to strengthen Medicare's trust fund by devoting a share
of the federal budget surplus to a much discussed "lockbox."
Once again the philosophical divide over Medicare's direction was
exposed. Gore's proposal harkened back to Medicare's roots, with a
commitment to universalism, government-provided benefits, and social
insurance. Significantly, however, the Gore proposal called for voluntary
enrollment rather than the mandatory enrollment conventionally associated with
social insurance arrangements. 133 From a strictly policy perspective, the logic
of insurance pools and adverse selection suggested that mandatory enrollment
for a prescription drug benefit was a sensible course. The political logic,
130. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HEALTH ISSUES IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
9 (OcT. 2,2000) (describing Al Gore's prescription drug plan during 2000 presidential election),
available at http://search.kaiserfamilyfoundation.org/kffpubs/index.html?qk=a.
131. See id. (describing George W. Bush's prescription drug plan during 2000 presidential
election).
132. See NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, FINAL BREAUX-
THOMAS MEDICARE REFORM PROPOSAL: BUILDING A BETTER MEDICARE FOR TODAY AND
TOMORROW, at http://medicare.commission.gov/medicare/bbmtt3l599.html (March 16, 1999)
(describing premium support system to provide comprehensive coverage) (on file' with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 130, at 7 (noting that Gore proposal for
Medicare reform would add voluntary drug benefit).
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however, argued for voluntarism due to the fact that roughly two-thirds of
seniors already had some form of drug coverage and because of the potential
stigma of a "coercive" government plan. Thus, Gore chose the more convenient
route of modified universalism. In contrast, the Bush plan relied on market forces
and the private sector for benefit expansion, rejecting the notion that the federal
government should directly provide the benefit through public Medicare.'34
Prescription drug coverage thus became another front in the war over the
future of Medicare between the old Medicare consensus and the new vision of a
Medicare market. The current debate over Medicare prescription drug coverage
is not really about prescription drugs. Rather, at stake in this debate is what kind
of program Medicare will be and what kind of public philosophy will guide its
future.
VI. Conclusion
In sum, 1995 marked the end of the liberal consensus that had governed
Medicare politics since 1965. The ensuing debate over the transformation of
Medicare from a public, single-payor program into one increasingly comprised of
private insurance plans is filled with historical significance. In particular, it
appears that the losing option in 1965-subsidizing the elderly to purchase
private health insurance-has re-emerged three decades later as a critical
influence on program policy. As the 2003 debate over Medicare prescription
drug coverage legislation makes clear, the Medicare debate of four decades ago,
with its polarizing politics and intense ideological cleavages, has indeed reopened
in American politics. But in the context of a changed health care system and
political environment, the tide of the debate over the appropriate federal role in
health insurance for the elderly has now turned toward proponents of the market.
As the 1997 BBA and troubles in the Medicare+Choice program signified,
however, it is unclear how far market proponents can push their agenda and how
successful it will be. There will be no easy resolution to this conflict. After
nearly four decades of operation, Medicare politics is back where it started.
134. See id. at 9 (explaining that Bush plan would allow choice between Medicare-
approved private health plan and government-sponsored plan).
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ADDENDUM
The enactment of Medicare prescription drug legislation in November
2003 was a milestone in Medicare politics. Medicare's political history has
long been a contest between two competing visions: 1 the liberal vision of
Medicare as a single-payor social insurance program operated by the federal
government, and the conservative vision of Medicare as a competitive market
in which the federal government subsidizes beneficiaries to purchase private
insurance. At Medicare's enactment in 1965, in the context of the Great
Society and wide Democratic congressional majorities, the liberal vision
prevailed. And, during the program's first three decades, a de facto consensus
governed Medicare largely according to these liberal programmatic properties
and principles.
What is so striking about the 2003 Medicare prescription drug legislation
is that it is, in crucial respects, a political reversal from 1965 and from the main
principles historically associated with Medicare. The new drug benefit will be
offered through private insurers, rather than as part of traditional Medicare, and
the legislation promotes the enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in private
managed care plans.2 It also allows benefits and premiums to vary across the
country by insurer, rather than guaranteeing a single level of coverage for the
entire nation. In 2010, a demonstration project in "premium support" will be
launched-potentially involving as many as six metropolitan areas-that will
introduce managed competition into the program. Finally, the law requires
that, for the first time, higher-income beneficiaries must pay higher premiums
for Medicare coverage.
All of this is, at least at first glance, a spectacular political victory for the
Bush Administration (as well as for the pharmaceutical industry, which escaped
price controls and re-importation). The legislation achieved more in terms of
reforming Medicare in a conservative direction than I believed possible given
1. See generally JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE (2003)
(discussing history of political conflict over Medicare).
2. For a good analysis of the details of the Medicare bill, see Jeanne Lambrew, Lost in
the Fine Print: Ten Overlooked Policies that Harm Medicare and its Beneficiaries, Center for
American Progress [hereinafter Lambrew, Lost in Print], at http://www.americanprogress.org/
site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8)VF&b= 13275 (Dec. 4, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) and Jeanne Lambrew, Medicare Legislation: Think Twice, Center for American
Progress [hereinafter Lambrew, Think Twice], at http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?
cid= {E9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03) &binid= {45E5F769-1 I E2-4D4C-8C
AO-B954FD9247CC) (Nov. 14, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the slim Republican majorities in Congress. At the outset, President Bush
sought to link adoption of a prescription drug benefit to broader changes in
Medicare. While his initial efforts to do so floundered, ultimately this linkage
was largely achieved. To be sure, conservatives did not get the full-fledged
transformation of Medicare into a premium support system that House
Republicans supported. The Administration also made key concessions:
Program beneficiaries can stay in traditional Medicare and obtain the full drug
benefit, and the benefit will be available to all Medicare enrollees.
But the legislation contains several important provisions that promote
private insurance, managed care, and ultimately, privatization. As previously
noted, the benefit itself will be delivered by private insurers, either through
plans that offer only prescription drug coverage or as part of Medicare coverage
by managed care plans. Moreover, the federal government will be legally
prohibited from directly negotiating with pharmaceutical companies over
prices, a provision that will ensure the maintenance of drug company profit
margins, at a high cost to Medicare.
Perhaps most crucially, the bill creates a $10 billion fund to encourage the
participation of private plans in Medicare and that changes the program's
payment formula for private plans in a way that will substantially boost
payments. 3 This latter change, buried in the technical minutiae of the 678-page
bill, could have a profound impact on the program by enabling Medicare
HMOs to offer very generous drug benefits. After the new payment
methodology goes into effect, HMOs will be paid an estimated 25% more than
it would cost the traditional Medicare program to serve the same beneficiaries.
4
This means that Medicare beneficiaries will have to join HMOs to obtain
comprehensive drug coverage (the law prohibits beneficiaries from purchasing
separate Medigap plans to fill in the holes in the benefit). Over time, that
inducement could hasten the departure of Medicare beneficiaries from the
traditional program, as they join private insurance plans that can, thanks to
increasing federal subsidies, offer them a better deal as a result of federal
overpayments. In the name of competition, Medicare in coming years will have
to compete in a one-sided system that favors private insurers.
Nevertheless, the final impact of the 2003 Medicare legislation, both in
political and policy terms, is far from clear. The experience with
Medicare+Choice, which also promised to move Medicare towards the market
and private insurance, but failed in practice to reach those goals, provides a
3. See Lambrew, Lost in Print, supra note 2 (describing $10 billion "stabilization fund"
to promote potentially costly regional and national private plans).
4. See id. (estimating that costs will be 25% higher under HMOs by 2006).
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cautionary lesson about the limits of anticipating the performance of market-
based health reforms. Such reforms are highly dependent on how private
institutions and individuals respond to government incentives, and there is no
assurance that these responses will take the predicted form. Much about the
Medicare drug legislation is uncertain, as journalist Robert Pear notes:
Will elderly people sign up for the new drug benefit? Can insurers secure
big discounts in negotiations with drug manufacturers? Will increased
federal payments lure private health plans into the Medicare market? Will
competition among health plans save money for Medicare? Or will private
plans cost more than traditional Medicare? Will employers scale back
health benefits for retirees, knowing they can get a basic drug benefit from
Medicare? 5
In addition, it is not clear what, if anything, will become of the planned
demonstration in premium support.
Perhaps the most crucial-and least predictable-variable is the political
sustainability of this legislation. The new Medicare drug plan is not (with the
notable exception of lower-income beneficiaries, who receive more generous
coverage) a very good benefit. The plan has a confusing structure and more
limited coverage than what younger Americans are accustomed to receiving
from their employers or what older Americans want and expect from Medicare.
The much-discussed "donut hole" means that Medicare beneficiaries have no
coverage in between $2,250 and $3,600 of spending on prescription drugs (a
budgetary savings gimmick to keep the program within its projected ten-year,
$400 billion price tag). In addition, Medicare beneficiaries must pay 25% of
drug costs (after a $420 annual premium) before they reach the $2,250
threshold.
How seniors react to the benefit once it goes into full effect in 2006-
beneficiaries will be offered a prescription drug discount card in the interim,
beginning in 2004-is the great unknown. It is possible that displeasure with
the benefit will lead to a political revolt among the elderly against the
legislation, such as occurred during the catastrophic health insurance debacle of
1989. And while the AARP's endorsement of the bill may have enabled its
enactment by giving cover to members of Congress, it is worth recalling that
the AAR.P also endorsed the catastrophic health insurance bill that was later
repealed. At the same time, the voluntary nature of the 2003 benefit may deter
a political backlash. Even if full-scale repeal of the 2003 bill is unlikely, there
5. Robert Pear, Medicare Law's Costs and Benefits are Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2003, at Al.
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are likely to be mounting political pressures to expand the benefit to fill in its
coverage gaps.
All of this volatility will play out against the polarized background of
Medicare politics. That polarization was evident in the heated rhetoric over the
Medicare drug law and in the close votes in Congress, with the legislation
passing 54-44 in the Senate and 220-215 in a dramatic vote in the House of
Representatives that was held open after Democrats initially appeared to have
enough votes to defeat the legislation; it was the longest recorded roll call vote
in House history.6 The ideological and partisan divisions over the Medicare
drug benefit can be expected to carry over into battles over Medicare reform in
the coming years. For the moment, President Bush and the Republican Party
have succeeded in weakening the Democrats' political advantage on Medicare,
a key political goal akin to President Clinton's signing of welfare reform. But
Democrats will not surrender Medicare so easily, and in 2004 and beyond they
will try to counteract Republicans' taking credit for expanding the program by
catalyzing opposition to the legislation.
The politics of Medicare reform are thus far from over. The prescription
drug legislation has not conclusively settled the battle over Medicare's
philosophy and program structure. With the baby boomers on the horizon, over
the next two decades partisan divisions will intensify and the stakes will grow
higher. A change in the definition of Medicare's fiscal solvency that was
attached to the Medicare drug legislation, triggering action if general revenues
comprise more than 45% of program spending,7 also promises to move up the
date of political reckoning.
6. See David Broder, Time Was GOP 's Ally On the Vote, WASH. POsT, Nov. 23,2003, at
A I (discussing House passage of Medicare bill).
7. See Lambrew, Think Twice, supra note 2 (criticizing "cost containment" provisions
that put off "hard decisions about Medicare's cost and financing to the next generation of
policymakers").
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